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Abstract
An important source of conflict surrounding nuclear energy is that
with a very small probability, a large-scale nuclear accident may occur.
One way to internalize the financial risks associated with such an ac-
cident is through mandatory liability insurance. This paper presents
estimates of the willingness to pay for increased financial security pro-
vided by an extension of coverage, based on the ‘stated choice’ ap-
proach. A Swiss citizen with median characteristics may be willing to
pay 0.08 cents per kwh to increase coverage beyond the current CHF
0.7 bn. (US$ 0.47 bn.). Marginal willingness to pay declines with
higher coverage but exceeds marginal cost at least up to a coverage of
CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.). An extension of nuclear liability insurance
coverage therefore may be efficiency-enhancing.
1 Introduction
Nuclear power plants provoke conflicts in many countries. While many vot-
ers and politicians are precommitted on this issue, others will gauge the
advantages and disadvantages of the nuclear option. On the downside, an
important consideration is that with a very small probability, an accident
causing billions of Dollars of damage may occur.
How important to Swiss citizens is relief from the financial consequences
of a severe nuclear accident? This paper purports to answer this question.
Relief could be achieved through the extension of the liability insurance
coverage mandated to nuclear power plant operators. The current insurance
∗We would like to acknowledge helpful comments and critics by participants of the
Economic Research Seminar of the university of Basel. Financial support came from the
Swiss Federal Office of Energy (Berne) and the Swiss Institute of Technology.
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coverage of CHF 0.7 bn. (approx. US$ 0.47 bn. at 2002 exchange rates)
written by private insurers will hardly be sufficient to compensate the victims
of an accident. However, an extension of coverage will result in a higher
price for nuclear power. Therefore, determining the importance accorded to
more comprehensive relief from the financial consequences of a severe nuclear
accident amounts to estimating the increase in the price of electricity that
would be accepted by consumers in return for extended liability coverage to
be bought by plant operators.
From the outset, two clarifications are in order. First, the risk to be
considered needs to be defined. In the production process of nuclear energy,
at least ten stages can be identified, each with its proper risks (Hirschberg,
Spiekerman and Dones (1998)). This paper deals exclusively with the risks
of nuclear energy produced in Switzerland. Second, focus is exclusively on
mandatory liability insurance as an instrument for risk internalization. The
many norms that govern the production of nuclear power, monitored by
the Swiss Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK), are simply taken as given.
However this regulation in combination with the legal norm of liability still
leaves room for what Shavell (1984), Shavell (1986) calls the judgement
proof problem. The judgement proof problem consists of the possibility
that nuclear power plant operators may fail to pay compensation for the
damage caused, due to lack of assets. As shown by Shavell, mandatory
liability insurance serves to avoid this shortcoming. This finding justifies
considering mandatory liability insurance as an instrument of nuclear risk
internalization.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the ‘stated choice’ alter-
native to the more conventional ‘contingent valuation’ method for eliciting
willingness to pay (WTP) is described and its use in the present context jus-
tified. Section 3 contains details concerning experimental design of a survey
designed to measure WTP for improved financial security in the context of
a nuclear accident. The econometric analysis follows in section 4, where the
WTP estimates are subjected to several tests. Section 5 presents a summary
and conclusions.
2 Determining Willingness to Pay Through ‘Stated
Choice’
For goods and services traded on markets, there is no need to measure
willingness to pay (WTP). By accepting a price the customer reveals that
his WTP is at least as high as the price. The safety of nuclear power plants is
not yet traded on markets (though it is possible to think of nuke-bonds which
mature in case of a prespecified accident). Neither do insurance contracts
against nuclear risks exist which would reveal potential victims’ willingness
to pay for nuclear safety.
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Figure 1: Trading off different product attributes.
Earlier attempts to measure WTP for nonmarket goods used the contin-
gent valuation method (see e.g. Mitchell (1989) and Hausman (1993)). In
the present context, respondents would have to state the maximum amount
per kwh they would be prepared to pay for the increased financial security
achieved by an extension of mandatory liability insurance. The difficulty
with this direct approach is that in real life people hardly ever ask them-
selves such questions. Rather, they compare the attributes of a good and
its price and then decide to buy it or not.
The ‘stated choice’ approach, developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982),
seeks to simulate this every day decision making. Its basic assumption is
that individuals derive utility from the attributes of products and are willing
to trade them off against each other (Lancaster 1966). In the present con-
text, the ‘stated choice’ method allows individuals to choose among different
types of electricity. During the decision process, the attributes (among them
price) of electricity are traded off against each other. By observing several
similar decisions it is possible to estimate how much income (through higher
electricity prices) respondents are ready to give up in return for extended
insurance coverage.
This is illustrated in figure 1. Utility increases with insurance coverage
in the event of an accident (as percent of maximum possible loss) and de-
creases with the average number of power blackouts; both attributes were
found to be relevant to the persons interviewed (see section 3). Assume
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that the status quo is given by combination A (1% insurance coverage, 2
blackouts/year). Point B indicates that the individual is willing to accept
a slightly higher number of blackouts if insurance coverage is raised to 2%.
The corresponding sacrifice in terms of security of supply is the marginal
WTP for an increased insurance coverage.
Now participants in the experiment are asked to evaluate additional
combinations, for example point C. If C is accepted, then the individual’s
indifference curve must lie above C. Next, if point D is rejected, it must
lie below D. Proceeding in this manner, it is possible to approximate the
indifference curve. Finally, the marginal willingness to pay measured in
money terms (MWP) can be estimated in the same way, by introducing the
increase in the price of electricity as an additional product attribute. The
corresponding increase in the outlay on electricity is a sacrifice of income
which would otherwise be available for spending on other goods.
Summing up, the experimenter is not limited to varying only price and
insurance coverage but can introduce other attributes that influence real
life decisions concerning electricity. Failing this, he runs the risk of causing
respondents to associate with variations in price or insurance coverage at-
tributes not explicitly included in the experiment (and therefore assumed as
fixed).
3 Experimental Design
In the context of a stated choice experiment several issues must be addressed.
What product attributes are to be included? How many levels should be
distinguished in an attribute (continnous representation being impossible)?
Which functional form of the utility function should be assumed? An ex-
tensive literature is devoted to these and other issues (see e.g. Louviere,
Hensher and Swait (2000) and Hedayat, Sloane and Stufken (1999)).
First of all, the relevant attributes of electric power need to be identi-
fied. Their number must be kept low for the decision problem to remain
manageable. In a separate survey, approximately 500 persons were asked in
spring 2001 to rate 15 different attributes, assigning them ranks between 1
(not important) and 10 (very important). Among the most important were:
secure and sustainable waste disposal (9.26), size of area exposed to hazard
(8.91), reliability (low frequency of blackouts) (8.68), financial compensa-
tion of the victims in case of an accident (8.78), and average price per kwh
(7.69).
Next, levels have to be assigned to attributes. Again they must be few
in number in order to avoid long interviews. But then, the levels must reach
sufficiently extreme values to cause respondents to switch from “accept” to
“reject” and vice versa.
To test the questionnaire, six persons were interviewed in a first pretest.
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Levels Unit Status quo
Price 0; 10; 30; 60 percent 0
Blackouts 2; 14 numb./year 2
Waste unresolved problems; – unresolved
no unresolved problems problems
Maximum lossa 0.1, 10, 100, 200 CHF bn. 200
(per houshold)b (35; 3,500; 35,000; 70,000) (CHF/HH) (70,000)
Coveragec 1; 20; 50; 100 percent 1
a Values in US$ bn: 0.065; 6.5; 65; 130
b Maximum loss in US$ per household: 21; 2,100; 21’000; 42,000 (at 2002 exchange rates)
c Coverage in percent of loss
Table 1: Levels of characteristics.
Without exception they understood the questions and were able to process
the 14 choice scenarios without problems. However, the attribute ‘insurance
coverage’ was regarded as relatively unimportant.
A second pretest comprising 20 persons was conducted, with the maxi-
mum price boosted to 60 percent in order to induce a sufficient frequency
of rejected scenarios (compared to the status quo). The most important
attribute was again safe waste disposal, this time followed by insurance cov-
erage and price.
The attributes and their levels used in the final survey are displayed in
table 1.
The attribute ‘Price’ is the percentage increase caused by the extension
of liability insurance coverage over the status quo. To obtain an absolute
value for willingness to pay (WTP), this value was multiplied by the annual
electricity bill as indicated by respondents.
The attribute ‘Blackouts’ indicates if the scenario considered has a high
incidence of blackouts (14 per year, coded 1) or a low incidence (2 per year,
coded 0). It is a proxi of service reliability.
Since ‘Waste’ was an important attribute in both pretests, it had to be
included in the final experiment. This variable takes on two values: Either
there are unresolved problems with waste disposal (=1), or there are no
unresolved problems with waste disposal (=0).
‘Maximum loss’ indicates that electricity generation may cause damage
amounting to e.g. CHF 100 bn. (appr. US$ 65 bn.) in the event of an
accident. In order to make this amount more comprehensible, it was also
expressed as an average per household.
‘Coverage’ indicates the part of maximum loss which would be covered
by liability insurance.
Note that the probability of an accident is not among the product at-
tributes. This has the advantage of easing the burden on the cognitive
capabilities of respondents. As is well known, most people have difficulties
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Decision No. 4209
Type A power Type B power
Price A kilowatthour costs the same
as today
A kilowatthour is 60 percent
more expensive than today
Blackouts 2 blackouts per
year on average
2 blackouts per
year on average
Waste There are unresolved problems
with waste disposal
There are no unresolved
problems with waste disposal
Damage A large scale accident can
cause losses up to a maximum
of Swiss francs 200 bn. (This
amounts to Swiss francs 70,000
per household on average)
A large scale accident can
cause losses up to a maximum
of Swiss francs 100 mn. (This
amounts to Swiss francs 35 per
household on average)
Insurance
Coverage
1 percent of this maximum
damage is covered
100 percent of this maximum
damage is covered
Type A Type B
Your Choice
cannot decide
Figure 2: Example of a choice scenario.
dealing with small probabilities (Starmer 2000). As a substitute, the prob-
ability estimates of experts were reported in the questionnaire, and respon-
dents were asked to mark their own subjective estimates of the probability of
a severe nuclear accident. In this way, the probability of an accident is held
constant throughout the experiment, preventing it from being correlated
with the attribute maximum loss (this would result in a biased estimate of
the corresponding coefficient in econometric estimation). At the same time,
this still permits to answer the question of wether a heightened perception of
the loss probability influences the marginal willingness to pay for increased
financial security.
Figure 2 shows one of the choice scenarios. Type A power is always
associated with the status quo scenario to simplify the decision making.
Nevertheless, 20 percent of respondents reported difficulties with the
questionnaire. Roughly 73 percent stated they considered one of the at-
tributes to be of overriding importance, which could be interpreted as an
indication of lexicographic preferences. However, the econometric analy-
sis failed to produce evidence suggesting that these individuals traded off
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attributes less frequently or less consistently.
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Data
Face to face interviews were performed in the German speaking part of
Switzerland during September and October 2001. With 391 persons evalu-
ating 14 out of a total of 42 choice scenarios, a total of 5, 474 decisions were
recorded. Respondents who felt unable to decide could always choose the
option “not able to decide”. This served to prevent choices at random by
individuals who in fact were indifferent or unable to decide.
In a total of 819 cases (15 percent), no choice was stated, resulting in
4, 655 usable observations. Only 90 percent of these (4, 154) were used for
estimation, while 10 percent were put aside for an out of sample test (section
4.5). In 27 percent of choices, the status quo was preferred.
4.2 Theoretical Background and Specification
No attempt was made to anchor specification in expected utility theory in
view of its lack of validity for small probability – high consequence risks
(Starmer 2000).
Instead a second-order Taylor approximation of a general utility function
in the retained attributes is used. To allow for heterogeneous preferences,
socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents are interacted with income
net of electricity outlay, in accordance with the standard procedure (Johnson
and Desvousges 1997).
For individual i and power type j the following model is assumed
Uij = βXj + γ1zi · (mi − Pij) + γ2zi · (mi − Pij)
2 ,
where Xj includes all linear, quadratic and mixed terms of electricity at-
tributes, including price (Pij). zi denotes the vector of socioeconomic vari-
ables, mi denotes income and β, γ1 and γ2 are to be estimated.
According to the random utility model (McFadden 2001), the respondent
evaluates the utility of the two scenarios and chooses the one with the higher
utility. If “A” denotes the attribute values of the status quo scenario, then
individual i chooses the alternative (B) of choice set j if
β(XBj − XAj ) + γ1zi(PiBj − PiAj ) + γ2zi(P
2
iBj
− P 2iAj ) − 2γ2zimi(PiBj − PiAj )
+ηi + ²ij > 0 .
The error term appearing in this comparision has an individual specific (ηi)
and a general component (²ij) that also varies with the choice set presented.
The two components are assumed to conform to the usual random effects
specification (Greene 1997, ch. 14), with ρ = var(ηi)/var(ηi + ²ij).
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Since almost half of the interviewed persons did not reveal their income,
the term mi is neglected in the estimation. Instead subsamples are cre-
ated (high income, low income, income not revealed) to allow for income
differences.
The dependent variable yij (choice of power type B) is given by
yij =


1, if
β(XBj − XAj ) + γ1zi(PiBj − PiAj ) + γ2zi(P
2
iBj
− P 2iAj ) + ηi + ²ij > 0
0 otherwise.
From this expression it becomes clear that the variables used in estimation
are the differences between the attribute levels of scenario B and scenario
A. For example DAM is defined as the maximum level of loss in scenario B
minus the maximum level of loss in scenario A (see table 2).
4.3 Explanatory variables
Table 2 shows the variables used and their labels. The product attributes
were already explained in section 3. Instead of price, the outlay on electric-
ity was used as an explanatory variable. In this way, an increase in outlay
(occasioned by a higher price) can be interpreted as a reduction of disposable
income. Of course, this holds only if outlay and price move in fixed pro-
portions, i.e. if the quantity of power consumed stays constant. Since price
elasticities of the household demand for electricity are low in Switzerland
(Bonomo, Filippini and Zweifel 1998), this assumption is justifiable.
Label Definition Mean Std.Dev.
WASTE =-1:no problems w. waste disposal -0.476 0.500
BLACKO Blackout 0.479 0.500
DAM Loss in CHF bn. -128.310 81.277
COV Insurance coverage 42.880 37.560
P outlay on electricity 260.398 376.655
DAM2 DAM2 -28256.030 16336.960
COV2 COV2 3334.892 4058.592
P2 P2 1019087.000 51089767.000
BLACKOP blackouts·outlay 580.458 981.833
WASTEP waste·outlay -316.995 843.406
DAMP loss·outlay -104770.800 140571.300
COVP coverage·outlay 52876.310 77898.460
DAMCOV loss·coverage 3217.482 5738.957
DAMWST loss·waste -169.752 62.457
continued...
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Label Definition Mean Std.Dev.
DAMBLA loss·blackouts 34.709 63.833
COVWST coverage·waste 20.738 33.267
COVBLA coverage·blackouts 22.633 35.385
HIGH accident probability higha 0.704 0.456
HIGHP HIGH·outlay 181.472 347.793
HIGHP2 HIGH·outlay2 746116.400 4946851.000
EDM medium level of educationb 0.825 0.380
EDH high level of educationc 0.079 0.267
EDMP EDM·outlay 206.751 300.625
EDMP2 EDM·outlay2 645225.400 2252081.000
EDHP EDH·outlay 35.281 259.240
EDHP2 EDH·outlay2 334052.200 4635214.000
AGE age 43.706 13.912
AGEP AGE·outlay 11492.580 17600.630
AGEP2 AGE·outlay2 4.54e+07 2.32e+08
SEXM genderd 0.504 0.500
SEXMP gender·outlay 136.013 325.082
SEXMP2 gender·outlay2 604057.200 4691084.000
C constant 1.000 0.000
Note: Attribute values shown are differences between alternative (B)
and status quo (A) and may therefore be negative
a) Dummy varible, = 1 if subjective probability of accident is higher than that of experts
b) Vocational school, community college, technical college
c) University for applied sciences, university
d) 0 = female, 1 = male
Table 2: Variables used in estimation.
Product attributes appear in linear, quadratic and mixed form. The
dummy variables for BLACKO and WASTE cannot be squared because of
multicollinearity.
4.4 Estimation results
4.4.1 General findings
The model in section 4.2 was estimated using a random effects probit spec-
ification. The estimation results for the approximated utility function are
displayed in table 3. This estimation excludes mixed terms involving income
in order to be able to use the full sample.
The significantly positive value of ρ = 0.56 shows that a random-effects
specification is appropriate as 56 percent of the variance of the error term
can be attributed to individual-specific effects. The linear forms of four out
of five product attributes have the expected sign; DAM is the only (and
insignificant) exception. Moreover, for damages exceeding the status quo by
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df/dxa Coefficient Std.Dev. z
BLACKO -0.08049871 -0.2205927 ∗ 0.1192424 -1.850
WASTE 0.25848292 -0.6598493 ∗∗ 0.1186114 -5.563
DAM 0.00082439 0.0021668 0.0016999 1.275
COV 0.00618963 0.0162685 ∗∗ 0.0033763 4.818
P -0.00358838 -0.0094315 ∗∗ 0.0015073 -6.257
DAM2 -0.0000103 -0.0000271 ∗∗ 8.09e-06 -3.348
COV2 -0.00003345 -0.0000879 ∗∗ 0.0000281 -3.124
P2 8.114e-07 2.13e-06 ∗∗ 5.13e-07 4.157
BLACKOP -0.00001751 -0.000046 0.0000639 -0.720
WASTEP -0.0000125 -0.0000329 0.0000586 -0.561
DAMP -3.366e-07 -8.85e-07 ∗∗ 3.91e-07 -2.264
COVP -7.092e-07 -1.86e-06 ∗∗ 7.45e-07 -2.503
DAMCOV 0.00001356 0.0000357 ∗∗ 0.0000107 3.321
DAMWST 0.00045898 0.0012064 0.0007812 1.544
DAMBLA -0.00013523 -0.0003554 0.000725 -0.490
COVABF 0.00052263 0.0013737 0.0015513 0.886
COVWST -0.00137768 -0.003621 ∗∗ 0.0016469 -2.199
HIGHP 0.00027532 0.0007236 ∗∗ 0.0003355 2.157
HIGHP2 -6.745e-08 -1.77e-07 ∗∗ 5.58e-08 -3.178
EDMP 0.0023652 0.0062166 ∗∗ 0.0013788 4.509
EDMP2 -6.464e-07 -1.70e-06 ∗∗ 4.93e-07 -3.448
EDHP 0.00314532 0.008267 ∗∗ 0.0014456 5.719
EDHP2 -7.836e-07 -2.06e-06 ∗∗ 4.97e-07 -4.147
AGEP 2.621e-06 6.89e-06 0.0000118 0.586
AGEP2 -1.855e-09 -4.88e-09 ∗ 2.58e-09 -1.887
SEXMP -0.00063002 -0.0016559 ∗∗ 0.0004084 -4.055
SEXMP2 1.530e-07 4.02e-07 ∗∗ 9.55e-08 4.212
C 0.08343199 0.2192885 ∗ 0.1326647 1.653
∗(∗∗): statistically significant on a 10%(5%) level.
ρ = 0.5643335
ση = 1.1398127
4′119 observations (375 individuals)
Log likelihood: −1948.9473
Log likelihood (constant only): −2337.5593
a) Probability differential relative to status quo.
Table 3: Estimation of utility function, with income excluded.
US$ 56 bn. or more, the negative sign of DAM2 changes the overall impact
from positive to negative (neglecting mixed terms). Therefore, at least in a
range of maximum losses considered realistic by experts, a further increase
of maximum loss lowers respondent’s utility, ceteris paribus. The strong
estimated influence of the waste disposal attribute confirms the results of
the two pretests.
The second column of table 3 shows the probability differential compared
to the status quo for a person with median characteristcs. For example,
the value of 0.26 for waste disposal (WASTE) can be interpreted as the
increase in the probability of such a median person preferring the scenario
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Figure 3: Density of MWP in cents/kwh. DAM = CHF 100 bn. (US$ 65 bn.),
WASTE=1, BLACKO=0 and COV=1%. (Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth
of 0.66)
that has no unresolved waste disposal problems (WASTE=0) over a scenario
with unresolved waste disposal problems (WASTE=1). On the other hand,
the probability of preferring a power type is reduced by more blackouts
(BLACKO=1) by a mere 8 percentage points compared to less blackouts
(BLACKO=0) and hence better reliability.
Most importantly however, additional insurance coverage (COV) has a
positive effect on utility. If coverage is increased to 100 percent, then the
probability of the corresponding power type being preferred increases by an
estimated 60 percentage points. Finally, electricity outlay has the expected
negative effect on utility despite the positive sign of P2. This is because the
socioeconomic interaction terms reinforce without exception the negative
marginal utility of electricity outlay.
4.4.2 Calculation of MWP for financial security
The marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for additional coverage is given by
MWP =
∂Uˆ/∂COV
∂Uˆ/∂P
,
with P defined as outlay on electricity so that −∂Uˆ/∂P is the estimated
marginal utility of disposable income. The ratio between the marginal util-
ity of coverage and the marginal utility of income defines the MWP for
11
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Figure 4: MWP in cents/kwh including 95 percent confidence intervals; 44 year
old woman, EDM=1, HIGH=1, DAM=100 (US$ 65 bn.), WASTE=1, BLACKO=0,
P=840 (US$ 560).
additional financial security through increased insurance coverage. In order
to express the MWP in terms of cents per kwh, the quantity of power con-
sumed must be known. This was calculated as the annual outlay devided by
the average price of electricity at the household level during the year 1999
(16.2 Rp/kwh, i.e. 11 cents), obtaining
MWP[cents/kWh] :=
MWP[US$/year] · 100
Outlay in US$/0.11
In order to get an impression of the MWP across the entire sample,
the MWP for increased coverage was calculated for each person based on
his or her specific socioeconomic characteristics and a power type which
has few blackouts (BLACKO=0), unresolved problems with waste disposal
(WASTE=1), a maximum possible loss of CHF 100 bn. (US$ 65 bn.) and
initial coverage amounting to a mere 1 percent (COV=1%). The resulting
density function is shown in figure 3.
Average MWP is 0.11 cents/kwh, while the median MWP lies at 0.07
cents/kwh. Compared to the average price of 11 cents paid in 1999, this
corresponds to one percent of the electricity price. This does not seem
excessive a priori, especially when taking the decline of MWP with increasing
coverage into account (see figures 4 and 5 below).
In order to check whether MWP values are significantly different from
zero, standard errors were calculated, using the delta-method although it
may result in an underestimate (see e.g. Polsky, Glick, Willke and Schulman
12
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Figure 5: MWP in cents/kWh of a 44 year old woman with EDM=1, HIGH=1
and outlay on electricity of CHF 840 (US$ 560) per year. Maximum loss is CHF
100 bn. (US$ 65 bn.), WASTE=1, BLACKO=0.
(1997) and Telser (2002)). However, the Filler method only works for a
simple ratio of coefficients, while bootstrapping would have been too costly.
Figure 4 shows the MWP of a person with median characteristics (woman
aged 44 with EDM=1, HIGH=1) along with its 95 percent confidence inter-
vals. Estimated MWP declines, becoming indistinguishable from zero near
an initial coverage rate of 84 percent. At a coverage level of 100 percent at
the latest, MWP should be zero. However, this restriction was in no way
built into the experiment. Figure 4 thus may be considered as providing
some limited evidence for the experiment’s validity.
4.4.3 Plausibility tests of estimated MWP
A first plausibility test derives from the influence of income on WTP. If
financial security is a normal economic good, MWP should be higher than
average among individuals with high income. This prediction is borne out
in figure 5 in that the high-income subsample displays a higher MWP than
the full sample up to an initial coverage of appr. 70 percent. Conversely,
the low-income subsample (which includes respondents not revealing their
income) lies below the full sample in this range. However, these differences
lack statistical significance due to small sample sizes.
Second, due to the income effect, MWP should decline with increasing
outlay on electricity. This is indeed the case without exception in both tables
4 and 5. Moreover, MWP again decreases with initial coverage for a given
value of electricity outlay, confirming figures 5 and 4.
Comparison of tables 4 and 5 (with maximum loss doubled) shows that
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Coverage Electricity outlay (US$ at 2002 exchange rates)
(percent) 400 530 670 800 930 1070 1200
0 0.1598 0.1185 0.0936 0.0770 0.0652 0.0563 0.0493
20 0.1297 0.0957 0.0753 0.0617 0.0520 0.0447 0.0390
40 0.1006 0.0738 0.0577 0.0469 0.0392 0.0335 0.0289
60 0.0723 0.0525 0.0405 0.0326 0.0269 0.0226 0.0192
80 0.0450 0.0319 0.0240 0.0187 0.0149 0.0121 0.0098
100 0.0185 0.0119 0.0079 0.0053 0.0033 0.0019 0.0007
Table 4: MWP in cents/kwh of a 44 year old woman with EDM=1, HIGH=1.
Maximum loss is CHF 100 bn. (US$ 65 bn.), WASTE=1, BLACKO=0.
Coverage Electricity outlay (US$ at 2002 exchange rates)
(percent) 400 530 670 800 930 1070 1200
0 0.1811 0.1346 0.1067 0.0880 0.0747 0.0647 0.0569
20 0.1518 0.1125 0.0889 0.0731 0.0619 0.0534 0.0468
40 0.1234 0.0911 0.0716 0.0587 0.0494 0.0425 0.0370
60 0.0959 0.0703 0.0549 0.0447 0.0373 0.0319 0.0275
80 0.0691 0.0501 0.0387 0.0311 0.0257 0.0215 0.0183
100 0.0431 0.0306 0.0230 0.0179 0.0143 0.0116 0.0095
Table 5: MWP in cents/kwh of a 44 year old woman with EDM=1, HIGH=1.
Maximum loss is CHF 200 bn. (US$ 130 bn.), WASTE=1, BLACKO=0.
MWP increases systematically with maximum possible loss. This too corre-
sponds with theoretical considerations if risk aversion is assumed (Chambers
and Quiggin 2000, ch. 3).
Finally, under very general conditions, the MWP of a risk averse indi-
vidual is predicted to increase with increasing probability of an accident.
Evaluation of the equation for MWP with regard to all relevant levels of
the attributes shows that the MWP of individuals with HIGH=1 (proba-
bility of accident is higher than experts’ estimates) is indeed greater than
with HIGH=0. Thus, an individual having the median characteristics of the
sample with HIGH=1 has a MWP that is appr. 0.013 cents/kwh higher,
given the combination of electricity attributes in table 4.
4.5 Out of Sample Test
The two performance criteria of an empirical investigation are its reliability
and validity (Singleton and Straits 1999). Reliability is concerned with the
stability and consistency of the operational definition (here: MWP); validity
is concerned with the goodness of fit between the operational definition and
the concept that it is supposed to measure (here: valuation of nuclear risks).
Since effective choices cannot be observed and compared with the stated
choices in the experiment, it is not possible to check validity directly, i.e.
wether estimated MWP for a reduction of financial risk is a good proxi for
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the valuation of financial consequences of nuclear risks.
However, there are studies suggesting that the ‘stated choice’ method
leads to results that are in line with corresponding hedonistic price estima-
tions (Gegax and Stanley (1997), Louviere, Meyer and Bunch (1999), and
Haener, Boxall and Adamowicz (2000)).
As to reliability, an out of sample test can be performed on the 10 percent
of observations that were not used for estimation.
The model predicts the probability of choosing the alternate scenario.
For a calculated probability of more than 50 percent, the individual is as-
sumed to choose the alternate scenario. It turns out that out of sample,
roughly 70 percent of all decisions were predicted correctly. This share has
to be compared to the share of correct decisions which would result from a
random process. In the sample used for estimation, the alternate scenario
was chosen 63 percent of the time. Now, a random process that generates
choice of the alternate scenario in 63 percent of all cases and of the status
quo scenario in 27 percent would predict correctly in 47 percent of cases, viz.
the sum of the probability that the random process predicted the alterna-
tive and that the alternative was actually chosen (0.632) plus the probability
that it predicted the status quo and that the status quo was actually chosen
(0.272).
The estimated utility model thus serves to increase the share of correct
predictions by 23 percentage points over a random process.
5 Conclusions
Measurement of willingness to pay for an increased internalization of the
risks emanating from nuclear power plants is important for energy policy.
One instrument of internalization is extending coverage provided by manda-
tory liability insurance for plant operators. For all its popular appeal, such
a proposal will face opposition in parliament and by consumers since higher
insurance premiums will lead to higher electricity prices.
This study seeks to determine how much Swiss citizens value increased
financial security through higher insurance payments in case of an accident,
by using the economic concept of marginal willingness to pay for (financial)
security.
This concept is implemented by a ‘stated choice’ experiment, in which
respondents decide in favor of or against an alternative to the status quo
characterized by several attributes of electricity. These attributes are varied
throughout the experiment, in contradistinction to conventional ‘contingent
valuation’ approaches. The relevant attributes were established by means
of three pretests and turned out to be price, frequency of blackouts, waste
disposal, maximal possible loss in case of an accident, and insurance cover-
age. The econometric analysis confirms this selection, since all attributes are
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estimated to be statistically significant arguments of the underlying utility
function. Average marginal willingness to pay for an additional percent-
age point of compensation for losses in excess of the status quo amounts to
some 0.11 cents per kwh (median value 0.07 cents), approaching zero when
insurance coverage goes towards 100 percent.
Specifically, an increase of mandated liability insurance coverage from
today’s CHF 0.7 bn. (US$ 0.47 bn.) to CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.) would
command a WTP amounting to 0.27 cents/kwh. This can be compared to
an estimate of additional cost. In a companion study, a log-logistic density
function for nuclear damages (i.e. the loss function for nuclear insurers)
was calibrated. According to that study, an increase of liability insurance
from today’s CHF 0.7 bn. (US$ 0.47 bn.) to CHF 4 bn. (US$ 2.7 bn.)
would result in an increase in the price of electricity of 0.008 cents/kwh
(Zweifel and Umbricht 2002, table 4.16). Therefore, quintuplicating current
insurance coverage could lead to a welfare gain for the majority of Swiss
citizens.
This proposition has to be qualified in several ways. On the cost side,
the choice of the distribution law can be criticized. Indeed, a different choice
(Gamma e.g.) would entail somewhat changed marginal cost estimates. On
the benefits side, one has to accept that no thought experiment can simulate
the actual decision environment completely. In particular there is no guaran-
tee that participants take described damages seriously and do not speculate
on the government providing financial assistance to victims in case of a ma-
jor accident1. On the other hand, estimated values of marginal willingness
to pay do exhibit theoretically plausible variations in several dimensions,
thus providing a measure of support for the validity of the experiment.
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